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Abstract 
This paper discusses the use of the Milgram obedience experiments and the Tuskegee syphilis study 
in the bioethical literature. The two studies are presented and a variety of uses of them identified 
and discussed. It is argued that the use of these studies as paradigms of problematic research relies 
on a reduction of their complexity. What is discussed is thus often constructions of these studies 
that are closer to hypothetical examples than to the real studies. 
Conscience and morality, Milgram teaches us, do not run in smooth, logical 
grooves but recede and advance according to the expectations and 
possibilities embedded in situations both more public and politicized 
than hypothetical moral dilemmas (Damico 1982, p. 427) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the ways in which research projects and their findings are used in 
ethical discussion is as paradigms. Certain studies are assumed to be so well 
known that you just have to mention their name, and a whole host of associations 
are supposedly established in the head of your reader. 
 
Two of the most central paradigms in this sense in the field of research ethics 
are the Milgram obedience experiments and the Tuskegee syphilis study (Bowman, 
1999, Fairchild, 1999).
1
 In this paper we will present an analysis of how these 
studies are used in writing and teaching about research ethics. We will show that 
the studies are often pared down to the bare essentials when they are presented, and 
that the considerable complexity of the actual studies has a tendency to disappear. 
The first part of the paper will briefly introduce the two studies. The second 
and main part will then look at a variety of uses of the studies. 
 
THE MILGRAM OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS 
From the moment Stanley Milgram published his first findings in 1963 showing 
that 65% of a group of ordinary experimental subjects where willing to give 
another person electrical shocks up to 450 volts if prompted to do so by an experimenter 
the Milgram experiments have been widely discussed (Milgram, 1963). 
Some have subjected the experiments, and Milgram personally to severe criticism, 




                                                          
1
 This paradigmatic status can for Instance be demonstrated by doing an Internet search with the 
keywords “Milgram and deception” or “Tuskegee and research.” 
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 positively biased, but nevertheless very thorough and readable overview of the first 20 years of the 
 Although Milgram only reported one experiment in his 1963 article the whole 
series of experiments actually involved 18 distinct experiments with a total of 
approximately 1000 subjects carried out at Yale University in 1960–1963. The first 
full account of all 18 experiments appeared in Milgram’s 1974 book “Obedience 
to Authority—An Experimental View” (Milgram, 1975). 
 
The basic research question for Milgram was not stated clearly in the early 
works, but a plausible reconstruction is “If X tells Y to hurt Z, under what conditions 
will Y carry out the command of X and under what conditions will he 
refuse?” In order to study this question experimentally Milgram created the following 
experimental design: 
 
“Two people come to a psychology laboratory to take part in a study of memory and learning. 
One of them is designated as a “teacher” and the other a “learner.” The experimenter explains 
that the study is concerned with the effects of punishment on learning. The learner is 
conducted into a room, seated in a chair, his arms strapped to prevent excessive movement, 
and an electrode attached to his wrist. He is told that he is to learn a list of word pairs; 
whenever he makes an error, he will receive electric shocks of increasing intensity. 
The real focus of the experiment is the teacher. After watching the learner being 
strapped into place, he is taken into the main experimental room and seated before an 
impressive shock generator. Its main feature is a horizontal line of thirty switches, ranging 
from 15 volts to 450 volts, in 15-volt increments. There are also verbal designations which 
range from SLIGHT SHOCK to DANGER—SEVERE SHOCK. The teacher is told that he 
is to administer the learning test to the man in the other room. When the learner responds 
correctly, the teacher moves on to the next item; when the other man gives an incorrect 
answer, the teacher is to give him an electric shock. He is to start at the lowest shock level 
(15 volts) and to increase the level each time the man makes an error, going through 30 volts, 
45 volts, and so on. 
 
The “teacher” is a genuinely naive subject who has come to the laboratory to participate 
in an experiment. The learner, or victim (sic!), is an actor who actually receives no shock 
at all. The point of the experiment is to see how far a person will proceed in a concrete and 
measurable situation in which he is ordered to inflict increasing pain on a protesting victim. 
At what point will the subject refuse to obey the experimenter?” (Milgram, 1974, p. 3–4). 
 
The 18 experiments are all variations on this basic paradigm, varying the 
proximity of the learner, the learners pain behaviour, the proximity of the experimenter, 
the displayed “experience or competence” of the experimenter, the position 
of the teacher in the chain of persons involved in administering the shock, and the 
presence of rebelling peers. 
 
The proportion of subjects defying the experimenter sometime before giving 
the 450 volts shock varies between 7% (in a variation where the teacher only 
says whether the answer given is right or wrong and someone else administers 
the shock) and 100% (in a variation where two experimenters disagree about 
whether the experiment should continue). This enormous difference in obedience 
in different contexts is often completely forgotten when the experiments are used 
in ethical discussion. 
 
In many of the experiments the subjects displayed severe psychological distress, 
and this is described extensively in Milgram’s articles: 
 
In the first four conditions 71 of the 160 subjects showed definite signs of nervous laughter 
and smiling. The laughter seemed entirely out of place, even bizarre. Full-blown uncontrollable 
seizures were observed for 15 of these subjects. On one occasion we observed 
a seizure so violently convulsive that it was necessary to call a halt to the experiment. 
(Milgram, 1965, p. 68). 
 
I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and 
confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was 
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rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse (Milgram, 1963, p. 377). 
 
After the experiment each subject was extensively debriefed. It was explained 
that no electrical shocks had been given to the learner, and subjects were given 
an explanation of the study aimed at bolstering their self-esteem and supporting 
their course of action. They were later sent a report which again explained 
the procedures used and the findings. Finally they were sent a questionnaire and 
84 percent indicated that they were glad or very glad to have participated in the 
study (Milgram, 1964). 
 
Milgram’s results have been extensively replicated and extended, and they 
seem to hold across cultures and with different types of experimental subjects 
(Mantell, 1971). Most of the replications are from the 1960s and 1970s and it is 
thus uncertain to what degree the exact levels of obedience found still holds today. 
 
THE TUSKEGEE STUDY 
The Tuskegee study is considerably older in its inception than the Milgram experiments, 
 but it entered the debate later. From 1932–1972 the US Public Health 
Service conducted an experiment involving the observation of the course of untreated 
(and under-treated) late syphilis in 400 African American share croppers 
in Alabama. The intention was to compare the prognosis of the untreated syphilis 
participants with that of another, non-syphilitic population. 
 
Syphilis was historically thought to be the product of sin and treatment was 
left to the individual sufferer. However, in the 1920s the public health system began 
to operate and efforts were made to treat rather than punish sufferers, partly as an 
attempt to stop the spreading of this infectious disease. In 1932 the best available 
treatment for syphilis was thought to be the heavy metal containing the drug 
“Salvarsan.”
3
 However, it was noted that, particularly in relation to late syphilis, the 
symptoms of the disease were perhaps less severe than the side effects of treatment. 
A Norwegian study that began in 1891 gave ground to this hypothesis. Thus the 
rationale behind the Tuskegee study at the time of the inception of the study was 
probably valid. The population in question had an extremely high rate of syphilis. 
They were underprivileged, and had therefore received little or no treatment. This 
was an important factor if the study was to reveal scientifically useful data. The 
main ethical dilemmas arise after the inception of the study and centre on three 
issues informed consent, exploitation, and access to treatment (see more below). 
It is these ethical dilemmas that have made the Tuskegee study (in)famous. 
 
MILGRAM, TUSKEGEE AND RESEARCH ETHICS 
How have the Milgram and Tuskegee studies then been used in discussions 
about research ethics? 
 
Milgram’s experiments have served two different purposes in writings about 
research ethics: 
 
1. As a touchstone for discussions of the ethics of deceptive psychological research. 
2. As a bad example of harm to research subjects. 
 
Deceptive Research 
The first paper on the ethics of Milgram’s research appeared only one year 
after the publication of Milgram’s 1963 article. In this article two major problems 
in Milgram’s design was identified and very harshly criticised. These were 1) the 
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 It is interesting to note that the name implies that this drug could either save the sufferer from the 
insanity which is a common consequence of late stage syphilis or save their health. 
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use of deception, and 2) the willingness to let the research subjects experience 
quite severe emotional distress (Baumrind, 1964). 
 
In the 1960s the whole field of research ethics was still in its infancy, and the 
present extensive public regulation was not in place. Deception in psychological 
experiments was widespread and Milgram’s experiments do not stand out as exceptionally 
deceptive compared with other experiments of the same period (Korn, 
1997). What led to the criticism of Milgram was probably a combination of the 
high visibility of the studies, their unexpected results, his negative moral assessment 
of his research subjects, and the degree of psychological distress experienced 
by the subjects. 
 
Be that as it may, it is interesting that of all the deceptive experiments performed 
then and since a very simplified version of the Milgram experiments have 
attained the status as the classical example of unethical deception. Little note is 
taken of Milgram’s debriefing efforts, if they are even mentioned. 
Using the Milgram experiments as the paradigm of deceptive research may 
have unfortunate side-effects, because it makes it less likely that the discussion will 
touch upon 1) the difference between research where deception is necessary and 
research where deception is merely convenient, and 2) research where deception 
is combined with the use of institutional coercion (for many examples of this latter 
sort of research see Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, 1996). 
 
Harm to Research Subjects 
As described above many of the research subjects in the Milgram studies 
experienced a significant level of distress during the experiments, and the second 
line of attack in the debate about the ethics of the experiments focus on this distress. 
Was Milgram justified in exposing people to such distress? And can researchers 
in general be justified in harming research subjects? 
 
This is the other main debate where the Milgram experiment is used as a 
paradigmatic example, but in this context not an example of deception but of 
problematic harm to research subjects. 
 
The harm done to the subjects was foreseeable. Prior to the actual experimental 
series Milgram had performed pilot experiments and therefore knew that high levels 
of distress would occur. 
 
Milgram and others have defended this infliction of harm in a number of 
ways: 
1. The harm was only temporary. 
2. The subjects consented to or accepted the harm subsequently. 
3. The harm was outweighed by benefits to the subjects. 
4. The harm was outweighed by the importance of the knowledge generated. 
 
There seems to be no way of denying that many of the subjects in Milgram’s 
experiments were harmed, in the same way that somebody on whom I inflict a brief 
pain is harmed, but it has been claimed that this harm is unimportant because it is 
not permanent, or at least not long lasting. There is still discussion about whether 
some of Milgram’s subjects were actually permanently harmed, for instance by 
realising some very difficult truths about themselves. But, even if it can be shown 
that the harm was only temporary in all instances, it seems to be a very weak basis 
on which to justify the infliction of this harm. A harm is a harm, and even small, 
temporary harms need some justification. 
 
In some of his writing Milgram claims that the acceptance of the subjects is 
the justification for the experiments: 
 
To my mind, the central moral justification for allowing my experiment is that it was judged 
acceptable by those who took part in it. Criticism that does not take account of the tolerant 
reaction of the participants has always seemed to me hollow. (Milgram, 1977, p. 21). 
 
As mentioned above, most of his subjects were glad that they had participated 
in the research, and other answers from the questionnaires showed that most also 
found the research important. It is a commonplace in the modern discussion of research 
ethics that retrospective consent is not consent, but at the most acquiescence. 
Milgram could, however, be read not as saying that the subjects retrospectively 
consented, but that their evaluation of the merits of the experiment should be given 
substantial weight when the ethics of the experiment is assessed. The merits of this 
argument are questionable. Even if we discount the obvious biases that are possibly 
influencing the subjects’ retrospective assessment of the experiment (wanting to 
make sense of a bad experience etc.), and take the answers to Milgram’s questionnaire 
at face value, we still have to remember that some subjects were not glad that 
they had participated in the experiment. For some the harm they had experienced 
was still unacceptable. 
 
A third way of justifying the foreseeable experimental infliction of psychological 
distress would be in terms of benefits to the subjects themselves. If for instance 
the psychological insights they gain about themselves are valuable insights then 
they may counterbalance the distress. There is unfortunately no research which can 
illuminate the empirical merits of this argument. A further problem is that unless 
it can be shown that every subject has benefited, or at least not experienced net 
harm, the argument collapses into a general consequentialist argument justifying 
the harm to some by the benefits to others. 
 
The final way of justifying the harm caused in Milgram’s experiments is by 
their general contribution to knowledge. The negative consequences to the subjects 
are outweighed by the positive benefits to all of us by having this knowledge. 
The results of Milgram’s experiments are surprising, and they arguably tell us 
something about human nature which it is very important to know (Kaufman, 
1967). This is probably the strongest of the possible defences of Milgram’s studies, 
but it is a defence that comes with a price. Milgram’s subjects had not consented 
to being harmed, and if the harm caused in this context can be justified by the 
good consequences generated the same must apply in many other circumstances, 
including many biomedical experiments. Milgram is aware of the problem and 
tries to block this consequence of the argument: 
 
I believe that it is extremely important to make a distinction between biomedical interventions 
and those that are of a purely psychological character, particularly the type of experiment 
I have been discussing. Intervention at the biological level prima facie places a subject 
“at risk.” The ingestion of a minute dose of a chemical or the infliction of a tiny surgical 
incision has the potential to traumatize a subject. In contrast, in all of the social psychology 
experiments that have been carried out, there is no demonstrated case of resulting trauma. 
And there is no evidence whatsoever that when an individual makes a choice in a laboratory 
situation—even the difficult choices posed by the conformity or obedience experiments— 
any trauma, injury, or diminution of well-being results. (Milgram, 1977, p. 22). 
 
Given Milgram’s own descriptions of the psychological distress of his subjects 
it seems extraordinary that he feels able to claim that no trauma or diminution of 
well-being has ever resulted from his experiments. For most people “ . . . a seizure 
so violently convulsive that it was necessary to call a halt to the experiment.” 
(Milgram, 1965, p. 68) would qualify as trauma and/or diminution of well-being. 
The further implications of a consequentialist justification of the harm caused to 
unconsenting experimental subjects in the Milgram studies can therefore not be 
blocked in this way. 
 
It is evident from the discussion that the Milgram experiments do have something 
to teach us about the acceptability of harms to experimental subjects, but 
using them as the paradigm case may be problematic. In the Milgram experiments 
the subjects were deceived and did not consent to being harmed. In the large majority 
of research taking place today the subjects have given their informed consent, 
and if the information has been sufficient they have therefore also consented to 
the potential harms described in the information. In this situation the central question 
about harm is completely different from the questions raised by the Milgram 
experiments. What we have to ask is whether subjects can validly consent to any 
magnitude of potential harm. Our analysis of that question will not be helped by 
looking at the Milgram experiments. 
 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF TUSKEGEE 
The Tuskegee study only ended in 1972 because the ethical concerns relating 
to it were printed on the front page of a prominent newspaper. The national outcry 
that followed was rekindled over the years and eventually resulted in a formal 
apology from President Clinton in 1997. Tuskegee has been heralded as a prime 
example of unethical and scientifically worthless research involving deliberate 
non-treatment, under-treatment, deception,
4
and exploitation. The study has also 
been labelled racist and an example of “genocide.” It is now generally referred to 
as the “infamous Tuskegee experiment”
5
, although it is not strictly an experiment. 




Many commentators are critical of the Tuskegee study for lacking scientific 
validity. They take the view that the research participants suffered in vain. Today 
the gold standard for research is the randomised controlled trial, and the Tuskegee 
study did not conform to this type of design. However, compared with the standards 
at the time of the beginning of the trial, the design was quite common. 
Other aspects of scientific validity more clearly fall short of today’s standards. 
One commentator argues: “The research began without formal protocols, continued 
sloppily, and never produced substantial findings.” (Rothman, 1982, p. 7). There 
were also numerous changes in personnel and irregular gaps between observations, 
weakening continuity. 
 
Were the study to come before a research ethics committee today, it would undoubtedly 
be turned down on a number of grounds, including the lack of scientific 
validity. However, in 1930 the observational method would have been considered 
perfectly adequate, and the absence of a clearly defined protocol at the beginning 
of the study, was largely a product of the times (McDonald, 1974). 
In fact, many recognise that Tuskegee was and remains an important contribution 
to medical knowledge (McDonald, 1974, Caplan, 1992). The study produced 
useful results in an area where information was desperately needed, and its scientific 
results are still quoted today. 
 
It is thus difficult to sustain the claim that the study was completely without 
scientific validity, unless one relies on the simplifying assumption that there are 
only two options, a study is either valid or it is invalid. This is clearly the assumption 
that is used when the Tuskegee study is presented a devoid of any validity (and 
there is an interesting parallel here to discussions about the Nazi concentration 
camp experiments), but it is an extremely dubious assumption. Validity comes in 
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 For example, some participants were wrongly told that the spinal taps they received constituted 
treatment when really they had purely diagnostic purposes. 
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 A search on www.google.com with the search words “Tuskegee and infamous” identifies more than 
2100 web-pages! 
degrees, just like epistemic warrant or verisimilitude. 
 
Lack of Informed Consent 
Perhaps the most widely held criticism of the study is that it lacked procedures 
for informed consent. In 1930 when the study began, the importance of consent 
was accepted to some degree, but largely as a procedure whereby the participant 
assents to various medical interventions. Today, and since the Nuremberg and 
Helsinki Declarations, consent also involves voluntary assent, and adequate information. 
Consent was sparse in the Tuskegee study. Even where there was assent, 
information was inadequate and deception was used to persuade participants to 
undergo diagnostic spinal taps. Allegedly, some patients were not even told they 
had syphilis, but warned that they had ‘bad blood’ which was interpreted in a 
number of ways. Though we might accept lower standards in 1930, due to the lack 
of ethical guidance, the US Public Health Service cannot reasonably be excused 
after promulgation of the Declarations of Nuremberg and Helsinki. 
 
It might be argued that the participants would not have consented to the 
spinal tap procedure without the deception, so defeating the research. Yet this is 
no justification; not only was the procedure itself of greater than minimal risk, but 
the deception undoubtedly caused harm, particularly in the form of non-treatment 
and undertreatment. 
 
Non-Treatment and Undertreatment 
The Tuskegee study was labelled one “of nature.” It was intended to observe 
the course of untreated syphilis in the light of evidence that salvarsan in the 1930s 
was of limited efficacy and availability. 
In fact the vast majority of participants received some form of treatment over 
time, but it was usually sporadic and was not supported by the study.
6
 The doubts 
as to the efficacy of Salvarsan in the 1930s seem valid in the light of the ‘Oslo 
study.’ However, penicillin was of proven efficacy, and was widely available from 
the 1953. The Declaration of Helsinki guarantees research participants rights to 
the best proven treatment but debate has waged continually as to whether this is an 
absolute concept, or simply guarantees the patient the best that would otherwise 
have been available to him or her. Were it the case that the population was not 
denied treatment, but also not specially singled out for treatment, then on the latter 
interpretation of the Helsinki Declaration, this aspect of the ethical dilemma might 
appear less severe. Conversely, Rothman, 1982 argues that the study should not 
even be labelled ‘a study of nature’ because it relied on social rather than biological 
conditions. Thus, had there been no known treatment for syphilis, a study of the 
natural course of the disease might have been ethical (had informed consent been 
obtained). Had the treatment been of such limited efficacy that a trial was ordered 
to compare the natural course of the disease with medically treated syphilis, this 
too may have been satisfactory. However, Tuskegee involved the use of participants 
who were socially deprived of the treatment and thus Rothman maintains that is 
was unethical to use them in the study of the course of the disease. 
 
On the other hand, Kampmeier, 1972 &1974 challenges the presumption that 
penicillin was the best proven treatment. In fact, he claims, penicillin was not of 
proven efficacy in the treatment of syphilis contracted up to 20 years before.
7
 His 
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 It was reluctantly reported (as evidence of treatment did not bode well for the scientific validity of a 
‘study of nature’) by those conducting the experiment, that “approximately 96% of those examined 
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 Kampmeier 1974, p. 1352. “The natural history of syphilis being what it is, the belief that the exhibition 
of penicillin for treatment of these men in 1953, two or more decades after infection, would have altered 
claim is that the state of medical knowledge in 1953, when penicillin became widely 
available stillwarranted a study of the natural course of late syphilis. Of course, the 
issue remains that the participants had not consented to being the individuals to test 
this hypothesis. However, Kampmeier has “no intention of becoming entrapped in 
this topic since to me the interpretation of customs and mores of a generation or two 
ago in today’s terms is a tilting at windmills. . . . Jenner, the Hunters, Pasteur and 
hundreds of thousands of physicians and surgeons of the past have been unethical 
in terms of “informed consent.” 
 
Arguably the study stood out more because of its high media visibility and 
racial connotations than the breaches of informed consent and right to best proven 
treatment. 
 
Exploitation of a Socially Vulnerable Group: Racism 
In 1981 James Jones published a book entitled “Bad Blood” in which he focused 
on the issue of racism. The experiment concerned black African Americans 
and many have concluded that the exploitation of this group of participants was 
racist in nature. Brandt, 1978 points out that when the experiment began there 
was a belief amongst the medical profession that black Americans were suffering 
an evolutionary degeneration. It was thought that they were particularly sexually 
promiscuous, and would be likely to shun treatment for sexually transmitted disease. 
It is possible that the study was trying to verify a myth existent at the time, 
which proclaimed that there are biological differences between black and white 
which result in different medical problems and necessary treatments. It is also suggested 
by some that the study may have been trying to dispel that myth (Reverby, 
1999). 
 
The people of Tuskegee (where the syphilis rate was 40%), were originally 
selected by the US Public Health Service for research attempting to eradicate 
syphilis with continued treatment of salvarsan. Unfortunately, the Depression hit 
the USA and money ran out. However, as those with syphilis had been identified, it 
was decided that a much needed observation of late syphilis would be undertaken. 
The original intention was therefore to single out a population with a high rate of 
syphilis who had received little treatment to date. 
 
Though it may be a valid point that issues of racism lie behind the study, it is 
perhaps wise to be wary of using a single case such as this to demonstrate racism in 
the medical research community. There is evidence of large scale distrust amongst 
the African American community, much of which stems from the Tuskegee study. 
Rothman argues: 
 
Case studies, like the one by Jones, can be intellectually dangerous undertakings, for unless 
they are informed by a wider context one cannot easily distinguish among causative 
considerations. . . . A larger perspective on Tuskegee reduces the contribution of race and 
gives the styles and mindsets of the research scientist much greater prominence. (Rothman, 
1982, p. 5). 
 
The Infamous Tuskegee Study 
The current received version of “The Infamous Tuskegee Study” is as a racist, 
scientifically invalid, unnecessary study that was ethically unacceptable already at 
its inception in 1932. This can perhaps best be illustrated by quoting the Presidential 
apology of May 16, 1997: 
 
The eight men who are survivors of the syphilis study at Tuskegee are a living link to a 
time not so very long ago that many Americans would prefer not to remember, but we dare 
not forget. It was a time when our nation failed to live up to its ideals, when our nation 
broke the trust with our people that is the very foundation of our democracy. It is not only 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the prognosis is without basis in fact.” 
in remembering that shameful past that we can make amends and repair our nation, but it is 
in remembering that past that we can build a better present and a better future. And without 
remembering it, we cannot make amends and we cannot go forward. 
So today America does remember the hundreds of men used in research without their 
knowledge and consent. We remember them and their family members. Men who were poor 
and African American, without resources and with few alternatives, they believed they had 
found hope when they were offered free medical care by the United States Public Health 
Service. They were betrayed. 
Medical people are supposed to help when we need care, but even once a cure was discovered, 
they were denied help, and they were lied to by their government. Our government 
is supposed to protect the rights of its citizens; their rights were trampled upon. Forty years, 
hundreds of men betrayed, along with their wives and children, along with the community 
in Macon County, Alabama, the City of Tuskegee, the fine university there, and the larger 
African American community. 
The United States government did something that was wrong – deeply, profoundly, 
morally wrong. It was an outrage to our commitment to integrity and equality for all our 
citizens. [. . . ] 
The people who ran the study at Tuskegee diminished the stature of man by abandoning 
the most basic ethical precepts. They forgot their pledge to heal and repair. They had the 
power to heal the survivors and all the others and they did not. Today, all we can do is 
apologize. (Remarks by the President in apology for study done in Tuskegee, 1997) 
 
But as we have seen above, all the elements of this received view are disputed. 
There are many problems with the Tuskegee study and very little doubt that it was 
deeply flawed and ethically problematic for a variety of reasons. But there is at the 
same time very little doubt that it was not as flawed or as unique as the received 
view claims. Many of its flaws are shared with other studies from the same period of 
our history, and many of the ethical problems were exacerbated by decisions made 
many years after the start of the project. That is exactly what makes it important not 
to proceed to a blanket condemnation, but to continue a debate about exactly what 
went wrong and why. Transforming the study into a paradigm of racist, unethical 
science may be useful for rhetorical reasons in order to create a rallying point for 
all good anti-racist forces. It is, however, also dangerous because we may end up 
forgetting that the Tuskegee study was not unique and that the American and other 
governments has done similar things on numerous other occasions. 
 
MILGRAM AND THE EXPLANATION OF EVIL ACTIONS 
Paradoxically the literature also contains a positive use of the Milgram experiments, 
but in this segment of the literature the focus is not on the methods but 
on the results. Already in his first article Milgram connected his the findings of his 
experiments with the atrocities of the Holocaust: 
 
Obedience, as a determinant of behavior, is of particular relevance to our time. It has been 
reliably established that from 1933–45 millions of innocent persons were systematically 
slaughtered on command. Gas chambers were built, death camps were guarded, daily quotas 
of corpses were produced with the same efficiency as the manufacture of appliances. These 
inhumane policies may have originated in the mind of a single person, but they could only 
be carried out on a massive scale if a very large number of persons obeyed orders (Milgram, 
1963, p. 371). 
 
and the Milgram studies have later been invoked to understand such atrocities as 
the My Lai massacre, the Jonestown mass suicide and many other similar incidents 
(Erickson, 1968). The arguments in which the findings of the obedience studies 
are used have the following common structure. 
 
1. An atrocity has occurred. 
2. Most of the persons involved in perpetrating the atrocity are normal people 
(i.e. display no obvious psychopathology and no general tendencies to hurt 
others) 
3. Most of these people stand in an authority relationship with someone 
ordering them to perform certain actions. 
4. Either a) the authority is personally present or b) the authority is personally 
absent and the acts required are some steps removed from the actual killing 
etc. 
5. The results of the obedience studies explains how the atrocity could have 
taken place given the conjunction of 2–4, and thereby dispels the apparent 
paradox of the conjunction of 1 & 2. 
 
This argumentative figure has close similarities to Hannah Arendt’s “banality 
of evil” analysis of Adolf Eichmann (Arendt, 1963), and the fact that the first 
Milgram results were published just after the Eichmann trial and in the same 
year as Arendt’s book, probably led to a “synergy” between these two modes of 
analysing evil actions in bureaucracies. 
 
The question is, however, whether the findings from the obedience studies 
can really be used in this way unless we again use not the real and complex set of 
experiments but the received simplified version. 
 
In this context it is important to note that legitimate authority comes in a 
variety of forms, and that the legitimation of these differs. Milgram’s experimenter 
figure possessed expert authority, partly by being the experimenter, partly by being 
directly associated with the prestige of Yale University; but expert authority is 
different from political authority in its legitimation, and may also be different 
in its effects (i.e. in the way it induces obedience). The expert is “an authority” 
whereas the politically derived authority may only be “in authority.” 
In obedience studies following the Milgram paradigm it has consistently been 
found that the effect of the experimenter’s authority decreases very sharply if he or 
she is not physically present. This seems to distinguish this form of authority from 
political (or politically derived) authority which often works (and must work) at a 
distance. 
 
This distinction between the kind of authority studied in the Milgram experiments 
and the kind of authority possessed by public servants in democracies may 
limit the generalisability of the Milgram findings. 
 
Another factor potentially limiting generalisability is the fact that these studies 
were performed in the laboratory. The laboratory is in itself a very special social 
context, with a special set of rules and this may clearly influence how far people are 
willing to go in following the orders of the “owner” of the laboratory. Some critics 
of the methodology of Milgram’s studies have emphasised this aspect and claimed 
that the laboratory, and the perceived rules of the laboratory are so different from 
normal life, that subjects are willing to do almost everything that an experimenter 
tells them to do, no matter how meaningless or repugnant it is (Patten, 1977). 
 
CONCLUSION 
As we have tried to argue above both the Milgram and the Tuskegee experiments 
are extremely complex and multifaceted. When they are used in bioethical 
and public discussions as paradigms there is, however, a strong tendency to reduce 
their complexity. One problematic aspect is emphasised and other aspects of the 
real research project bracketed. The reason for this is that the projects are often 
mentioned or used in papers concerned with a certain topic, for instance deceptive 
research, and only appear there as exemplars of problematic deception. As we 
have seen above the use of deception in the actual projects is quite complicated 
and have even been defended by some. 
 
The irony is thus that although morality does “…not run in smooth, logical 
grooves but recede and advance according to the expectations and possibilities embedded 
in situations both more public and politicized than hypothetical dilemmas” 
(Damico, 1982, p. 427) the studies of real life that teaches us this lesson are very 
often reduced to the bare bones of hypothetical dilemmas when used as examples 
in writing about bioethics. 
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